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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus Curiae The National Association of Public
Defense (NAPD)1 is an association of more than 14,000
professionals who deliver the right to counsel
throughout all U.S. states and territories. NAPD
members include attorneys, investigators, social
workers, administrators, and other support staff who
are responsible for executing the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. NAPD’s members are
the advocates in jails, in courtrooms, and in
communities.  They are experts in not only theoretical
best practices, but also in the practical, day-to-day
delivery of indigent defense services. Their collective
expertise represents state, county, and local systems
through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel
delivery mechanisms, dedicated juvenile, misdemeanor,
felony, capital, and appellate offices, and through a
diversity of traditional and holistic practice models.
With reference to the Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
NAPD has been a leader in training public defenders to
vigorously defend their clients’ rights.  To this end,
NAPD hosts annual conferences where suppression
advocacy is addressed, conducts frequent webinars on
Fourth Amendment topics, and otherwise provides
training to its members with respect to challenging
1 Pursuant to Rule 37, counsel note this brief was not authored by
counsel for either party, and neither the parties nor their counsel
have made any monetary contributions to the preparation or
submission of this brief. The law firm of Nixon Peabody LLP
undertook the printing and filing of this brief on a pro bono basis.
After timely notice, the parties have consented to the filing of this
brief.
2
warrantless searches through motions to suppress both
at the trial level and on appeal. Accordingly, NAPD has
a strong interest in the issues raised in this case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
NAPD submits this brief in support of the Petition
which seeks to clarify the appellate standard of review
that applies to a trial court’s conclusion that an
individual voluntarily consented to a warrantless
search. Criminal defense lawyers and their clients face
real and systemic problems arising from the lack of a
consistent, articulable standard of review for
evaluating consent searches. Some appellate courts
treat a determination that the defendant voluntarily
consented to a search as a finding of fact and subject it
only to clearly erroneous review, while other appellate
courts view that determination as a mixed question of
law and fact and review it de novo.  In a close case, the
difference in the standard of review may dictate the
outcome. 
The question of whether the accused or someone
else voluntarily consented to a warrantless search
arises with regularity in criminal proceedings and often
assumes a central or even dispositive role in the case.
Where the lawfulness of the search is objectively
brought into question, a well-taken suppression motion
may translate into materially more lenient plea offers.
In some cases, the decision to accept a plea or go to
trial, as well as the decision to appeal after a trial, will
be tied directly to defense counsel’s evaluation of the
strength of the suppression motion. This includes how
the trial court’s findings will be treated on appeal.  For
example, in jurisdictions where the appeals court
reviews the trial court’s ruling for clear error, rather
3
than de novo, defense counsel is likely to view the
suppression motion as rising or falling solely in the
trial court.  This is so because appellate courts looking
for clear error will rarely disturb a trial court’s finding
that an individual voluntarily consented to a search. 
In these cases, public defenders may compensate for
less robust review on appeal by more vigorous advocacy
in the trial court.  On the other hand, in jurisdictions
where suppression motions are reviewed de novo on
appeal, defense attorneys may be more likely to enter
into conditional pleas, permitting an appeal if they are
unsuccessful at challenging consent searches.  Thus, on
a pragmatic level, the consequences of disparate
standards of review are tangible, and the lack of a
consistent appellate standard impacts the advice and
advocacy public defenders provide their clients.
This Court should provide defense counsel—and the
accused, whose life and liberty are at stake—with a
clear, uniform standard of review that can guide these
important decisions.  The adjudication of suppression
motions gives concrete meaning to the promise of
constitutionally-protected liberty interests under the
Fourth Amendment. It is only through such motions
that our justice system ensures freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
In the case of our Fifth Amendment rights to be free
of coerced confessions, the nation’s appellate courts
speak with one voice:  they all apply de novo review to
any determination that the defendant voluntarily
confessed.  That makes sense.  The same uniform
standard of review logically should apply to the
determination that an individual voluntarily consented
to a search. 
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But that is not the case. Unfortunately, state and
federal courts do not speak with one voice when it
comes to appellate review of decisions regarding the
consent to search.  The judicial variability in the
standard of review exists across state and federal
courts, with some courts issuing decisions that are
either obtuse or self-contradictory, as different panels
within the same court disagree as to the correct
appellate standard. For NAPD’s members, this
uncertainty presents a great challenge in advising
clients about the likelihood of a suppression motion
being granted either by the trial court or on appeal.  By
clarifying the standard of review applicable to consent
searches, the Court would also in a sense preserve the
protected Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by
equipping public defenders with the clarity they need
to adequately advise, represent, and advocate for their
clients.  As such, this case commands the Court’s
review.
ARGUMENT
I. The Impact on Representation:  How The
Murkiness of the Standard of Review
Impairs Representation and Hurts
Defendants.
Public defenders around the country regularly
encounter warrantless searches where the government
relies on voluntary consent to overcome the absence of
a search warrant. In each such case where the
standard of review is unsettled on its face or in its
application, the lack of clarity has a major impact on:
(1) the public defender’s ability to counsel clients, and
(2) the client’s ability to make an informed decision.
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This has both Fourth Amendment and Sixth
Amendment implications.
Public defenders owe a duty of competent
representation to their clients.  See, e.g., Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); ABA Criminal
Justice Standards for the Defense Function 4-1.2(b)
(4th Ed.) (“[t]he primary duties that defense counsel
owe to their clients…are to serve as their clients’
counselor and advocate with courage and devotion
[and] to ensure that constitutional and other legal
rights of their clients are protected.”).  Indeed, the
client’s right to effective assistance of counsel means
nothing if the attorney assigned is not adequately
equipped, with both knowledge and resources, to
represent the client. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68 (1986).  To be sure, the right to counsel is
fundamental because it ensures that our adversarial
criminal legal proceedings are fair and that resulting
judgements are viewed as having legitimacy.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1984). As
this Court’s Chief Justice rightly observed,
“[P]rosecutors, when they rise in court, represent the
people of the United States. But so do defense
lawyers—one at a time.” Kaley v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 1090, 1114 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
The Court has insisted that criminal defense
lawyers have a Sixth Amendment “duty to bring to
bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial
a reliable adversarial testing process.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688. That “skill and knowledge” includes
identifying, investigating, and litigating motions to
suppress illegally seized evidence. Kimmelman, supra;
see also National Legal Aid and Defender Assn.,
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Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense
Representation § 5.1-5.3 (1995) (emphasizing
importance of pretrial motions, including suppression
motions). The same interests are protected by the due
process right to present a complete defense, that is, to
confront and contest the prosecution case at every
phase of the proceedings and through all available legal
avenues. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 294 (1973); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690
(1986).  Equally crucial to the fairness and legitimacy
of criminal proceedings are counsel’s duties to advise
the client “with complete candor concerning all aspects
of the case, including a candid estimate of the probable
outcome,” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
Prosecution Function and Defense Function 4-5.1(a)
(3d Ed. 1993). This duty is closely related to counsel’s
obligation of keeping the client abreast of developments
in the case.  This includes issues related to the
litigation of suppression motions, that will help the
client “to make informed decisions” about his or her
case. Id.; ABA Standard 4.3-8; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 366-367 (2010) (“[p]revailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association
standards and the like . . . are guides” to defining the
substantive meaning of the right to counsel (internal
citations omitted)).
The Court should grant certiorari in the instant
case because the fulfillment of these fundamental
rights and duties is being hindered unnecessarily by
the deep divisions across the country regarding the
applicable standard of review on appeal of Fourth
Amendment suppression claims. The need for clarity is
heightened by empirical analysis revealing that,
despite the marginal success rates of suppression
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motions at trial, see Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal
Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 223, 226 (1987), these motions nevertheless play
a crucial role in defendants’ exercise of their
fundamental right to go to trial versus pleading guilty
and underscore the need for accurate advice on the
implications of filing, litigating, and appealing such
motions. See id. at 237-238.
The need for clarity on the issue before this Court is
particularly keen in the vast majority of criminal cases
that involve public defenders.  See, e.g., Caroline Wolf
Harlow, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000),
a v a i l a b l e  a t  h t t p : / / w w w . b j s . g o v / i n d e x .
cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=772 [http://perma.cc/54XC-TNMS]
(estimating that eighty-two percent of criminal
defendants facing felony charges cannot afford to hire
counsel). This is so because, in fulfilling client rights
and reciprocal duties to offer sound advice about the
prospects for success in litigating a suppression motion,
and on the crucial implications of that litigation for the
decision to plead guilty or go to trial, public defenders
face enormous hurdles in establishing and building the
trust and open communication that serves as a
foundation for providing that advice and ensuring that
indigent defendants can hear and act upon it. To put it
bluntly, a “Public Pretender” stereotype taints far too
many relationships between indigent defendants and
their lawyers.  See Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have
a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public
Defender, 1 Yale Rev. L. & Soc. Action 4 (1971).
Empirical research documents the distrust that many
indigent defendants have toward state-provided
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counsel, whether those lawyers are viewed as being
partners in the prosecution, as simply being
incompetent, or as being so overworked and
underresourced that they cannot fulfill the basic duties
to communicate, investigate, and advocate.  See, e.g.,
Christopher Campbell et al., Unnoticed, Untapped, and
Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions of their Public
Defenders, 33 Behav. Sci. Law 751, 762-764 (2015); see
also Marla Sandys & Heather Pruss, Correlates of
Satisfaction Among Clients of a Public Defender
Agency, 14 Ohio State J. Crim. L. 431, 455 (2017)
(demonstrating importance to defendants of core rights
to communication, investigation, and advocacy by
public defense lawyers). Client concerns about the
competency and effectiveness of public defenders are
heightened if the appointed attorney cannot explain the
standard of appellate review or offer a reasonable
prediction of the outcome of the appeal.
Regrettably, the judicial morass that exists with
respect to the standard of review for consent searches
(see Petitioner Murat Aksu’s Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 15-25) leaves public defenders ill-
equipped to offer advice.  Take, for example, a federal
public defender in the Fourth Circuit who must explain
to a client the standard of review that will be applied
by the court of appeals after the district court rules on
the client’s suppression motion challenging a consent
search. The law in the Fourth Circuit is incredibly
fractured as to how appellate panels treat appeals of
consent searches.  Compare United States v. Robertson,
736 F.3d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 2013), and United States v.
Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir. 2002). See
Argument Point II, infra.  Some judges in that circuit
apply a variation of the “clearly erroneous” standard
9
that recognizes a legal element in the analysis, and will
in effect (if not in name) apply a deferential standard
to the historical facts and de novo review to the
ultimate legal question of “voluntariness.”  See
Robertson, 736 F.3d at 680 (majority).  A defense
attorney in the Fourth Circuit would have no way to
predict how the standard of review will be applied. In
this way, the failure of the courts to articulate and
apply a consistent standard of review leaves lawyers
poorly equipped to advise their clients, and leaves
clients without important information that should be
available to them in order to make an informed
decision about accepting a plea, going to trial, or
appealing. Saying to a client “it’s a crap shoot” is a poor
excuse for legal advice. But it may be the best a public
defender can do with the unsettled, conflicting, and
unclear standards of review that many appellate courts
now apply to voluntariness findings.  
Granting the Petition will allow the Court to clarify
the legal test for the voluntariness of consent to search
and allow state and federal courts to adopt clear and
consistent standards of appellate review.  This will
enable state and federal public defenders to do their
jobs, advising clients about an often crucial part of the
case, and allow clients to make informed choices.  The
Court should accordingly accept review of this case to
clarify the standard of review that applies to consent
searches.
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II. A Practical Example:  The Fourth Circuit’s
Split Panel Decision in United States v.
Robertson  
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Robertson, 736 F.3d 677 (4th Cir. 2013), and the
district court litigation that preceded it, provide a
poignant example of just how disruptive the lack of a
concise, defined standard of review for consent searches
can be. 
A. District Court Denial of Suppression
Motion 
In Robertson, the district court denied the
defendant’s suppression motion which sought to
prevent admission into evidence of a firearm removed
from the defendant’s waistband during a warrantless
search at a bus stop.  United States v. Robertson, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135526 (N.D.N.C. Nov, 22, 2011). The
district court heard testimony from live witnesses,
including the arresting officer and the defendant. Id. at
*1-5. In finding the defendant had voluntarily
consented to the search of his person, the district court
credited the testimony of the arresting officer who
conducted the search. Id. at *1. The court found the
defendant’s testimony was not credible. Id. at *6. The
district court issued a thorough and well-reasoned
opinion, according to the dissenting member of the
Fourth Circuit panel. United States v. Robertson, 736
F.3d, 677, 681 (4th Cir. 2013) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
The record established that police responded to a call
of “a disturbance involving three black males in white
t-shirts chasing another person with a firearm.”
Robertson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135526, at *1-2.  The
chase occurred in an urban, high crime area. Id. at *2,
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22.  Three police cars carrying four or five officers
responded. The arresting officer is of short stature
(5’2”).  Id. at *23; Robertson, 736 F.3d at 679.  He found
the defendant (who is 6’1” tall) seated alone in a bus
stop shelter. Robertson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135526,
at *3. He was sitting apart from several African
American men wearing white t-shirts.  Id.  The
defendant had on a dark t-shirt. Id.  The officer stood
outside the shelter and said, “Do you have anything
illegal on you?”  Id.  He then beckoned with his hand
for the defendant to step outside the shelter and come
toward the officer while at the same time asking if he
could search him. Id.  The defendant walked several
feet toward the officer in response to the officer’s hand
motion and raised his arms.  Id. at *4.  He apparently
did not say anything while doing so.  The officer
“regarded this as consent.” Id.  At no time did the
officer advise the defendant he did not have to consent.
Id.
The district court acknowledged that the
government bore the “burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it obtained the
knowing and voluntary consent to search and that the
“[g]overnment must shoulder the burden of proving an
individual freely and intelligently [gave] unequivocal
and specific consent to the search uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion, actual or implied.”  Id. at *19.
Reciting the voluntariness standards in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973), and surveying
numerous circuit and district court cases, the district
court concluded, based on the totality of circumstances,
that the government met its burden.  Robertson, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135526 at *7-29.  The minimal police
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contact was not coercive. The hand motion did not
amount to a seizure (id. at *18-19) or strip the
subsequent search of its consensual nature.  Id. at *24.
The defendant simply cooperated.  Id. at *24 & n. 9.
These facts present a close question as to the
voluntariness of the consent.  The closeness of the call
is reflected in the length and thoroughness of the
district court’s opinion, in particular with respect to the
officer’s non-verbal command with his hand—with the
court emphasizing its “careful consideration” of the
arguments and case law on this point. See id. at *4, 11-
19, 24-26. 
B. Fourth Circuit 2-1 Reversal 
1. Majority opinion 
The circuit court reversed the district court’s ruling
on the suppression motion.  The majority purported to
apply a clearly erroneous standard of review.
Robertson, 736 F.3d at 680.  The majority accepted the
testimony of the arresting officer.  The panel found,
however, that the testimony did not establish lawful
consent, but rather “begrudging submission to a
command.”  Id. The majority observed that the “area
around the bus shelter was dominated by police
officers” (three police cars and five officers with
holstered weapons) and the arresting officer was
“immediately accusatory.”  Id.  “When [the defendant]
responded with silence, the officer waved [the
defendant] forward and asked to conduct a search.”  Id.
The office blocked his path.  The majority of the panel
believed these facts prevented voluntary consent to be
given. Id.  “[The] officer’s initial, accusatory question,
combined with the police-dominated atmosphere,
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clearly communicated to [the defendant] that he was
not free to leave or refuse [the] officer’s request to
conduct a search.” Id.  The defendant “never gave
verbal or written consent but merely surrendered to a
police officer’s command.” Id.  His “behavior was not a
clear-eyed voluntary invitation to be searched; it was a
begrudging surrender to [an] Officer’s order.” Id. at
681.  The majority therefore reached an altogether
different conclusion than the district court based on the
same pattern of facts.
2. Dissenting opinion
The dissenting member of the panel agreed that the
record could be read as the majority did, but disagreed
that such a reading was compelled. Robertson, 736 F.3d
at 681-682. The dissent stated that “[t]he voluntariness
of consent to search is a factual question, and as a
reviewing court, we must affirm the determination of
the district court unless its finding is clearly
erroneous.” Id. at 681 (quoting United States v.
Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). 
The dissent found “the majority’s findings and opinion
. . . every bit as logical and plausible as . . . the district
court’s findings and opinion” but reasoned that the
clear error standard of review “requires this court to
defer to the district court’s plausible findings.”  Id. at
682.  As the dissent noted, “the question is not whether
the court of appeal’s ‘interpretation of the facts (is)
clearly erroneous, but whether the District Court’s
finding [is] clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing Anderson v.
City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-574 (1985)).  
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C. The Impact of Robertson 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Robertson
highlights the need for a consistent standard of review
regarding the factual underpinnings of consent search
findings.  As one scholar has noted, in Robertson and
other cases involving consent to search, “there [are] two
layers of facts: The facts of what happened, and then
the fact of whether the consent was voluntary.”2
The Fourth Circuit’s various pronouncements on the
standard of review, and its struggles to apply it,
illustrate a broader problem, one that is found in many
state and federal courts.  The law/fact distinction
confounds lawyers and judges alike.  No appellate
standard of review should be so hard to perceive,
understand, and apply. 
III. The Policy Choice Implicit In Deciding 
Suppression Motions Supports De Novo
Review.  
Determining whether consent to search was given
voluntarily presents not only a mixed question of fact
and law but in close cases offers a policy choice for the
court, one that requires balancing liberty interests
against public safety interests. See Brian A.
Sutherland, Whether Consent to Search was Given
2 See “Voluntariness and the Law/Fact Distinction” by Orin Kerr
(Law Professor at George Washington Law School), The Volokh
Conspiracy, December 5, 2013 12:08 am in Fourth Amendment
available at http://volokh.com/2013/12/05/voluntariness-lawfact-
distinction/.  The blog posts by Professor Kerr examined the circuit
court’s doctrinal confusion and presciently called for clarification
from the Supreme Court.   
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Voluntarily: A Statistical Analysis of Factors that
Predict the Suppression Ruling of the Federal District
Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2192, 2195 (2006)(“The
results of this study support the legal fiction hypothesis
that ‘voluntariness’ is a ‘placeholder for an analysis of
the competing interests of order and liberty’”)(hereafter
“Statistical Analysis”)  (quoting Tracey L. Meares &
Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent
Adjudication and Social Science Research in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 733, 738 (2000)). 
According to the “Statistical Analysis,” which offers
an empirical study of federal suppression motion
rulings, the finding that consent was given voluntarily
amounts to a “legal fiction” that depends not on the
totality of the circumstances, but rather, on whether
police misconduct occurred. In this way the suppression
motion serves as a proxy referendum on police behavior
rather than a true evaluation of the person’s ability to
give voluntary consent, whether judged objectively or
subjectively. See Sutherland, 81 N.Y.U L. REV. at 2194-
2195. In short, this study concludes that “consent is
voluntary in the absence of police misconduct.”  Id. at
2194-95 (“courts find consent voluntary if the evidence
does not show police misconduct”). Factors not related
to police misconduct have little or no bearing on the
outcome of a suppression motion.  Id. at 2195. The
findings of the Statistical Study appear to be borne out
by the increase in suppression motions being granted
in response to aggressive policing activities. See Steven
Brill, An Uptick in Granting Suppression Motions: Is
Stop-and-Frisk to Blame?, Huffington Post  (June 17,
2014) (“The common theme among the cases is the
courts’ finding of facts that indicate that police officers
16
testifying at hearings have been not credible or have
been actually misleading in their representations to the
court”), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
steven-brill/undefined. 
Given the legal and policy implications of any
determination that an individual consented to a police
search, courts should apply de novo review. 3 This
would bring Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in line
with the Fifth Amendment case law holding that the
voluntariness of a person’s confession is a legal
question that is reviewed de novo. See Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 24-25, 30-32.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the National Association
for Public Defense urges the Court to grant the Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari in this case and to clarify the
standard of review that applies to appeals of consent
searches.
3 Moreover, de novo review permits consideration of nuances that
otherwise may be missed in the district court’s analysis and
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